The effect size was much lower in non-Western cultures than in Western cultures. The authors suggest that the low effect size might be due to different conceptualizations of moral identity between cultures or due to the lack of validity of the current moral identity measures in non-Western cultures. He proposes that, in addition to considering ego and personal identity, we should also incorporate cultural context.
This is because while ego and personal identity are intrapersonal context areas that lead us to consider personal characteristics and sense of self, adding the cultural context helps us to expand our understanding by encouraging us to consider categories such as native language, country of origin, and racial background. As a result, identity represents a coherent picture that one shows to both oneself and to the outside world.
Thus, moral identity research should not only focus on individual levels, but on a cultural level as well. To what extent moral identity is a function of interacting in a specific culture is a major question that has only recently been raised in moral identity research.
Like many other moral constructs, the moral identity concept is rooted in a Western cultural context that stresses an individually oriented morality.
In contrast, people from Eastern cultures consider a highly moral person to be societally oriented. In this moral orientation, people tend to define themselves in the context of collectivism and an interdependent self Markus and Kitayama, Confucianism provides further support of the societally oriented moral system in Eastern cultures. Chinese education system employed Confucian values of effortful and respectful learning Hwang, Consequently, for s of years, Chinese citizens were accustomed to giving, obeying, and following authority.
Extended families with hierarchical relationships were also important in traditional Chinese society. Thus, Chinese people should attribute national and societal meanings to the concept of a highly moral person, based on the moral ideology that nation is the most basic and important source of collective identity. Empirically, Hertz and Krettenauer note that the majority of moral identity research is based on the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Questionnaire Aquino and Reed, This measure provides participants with a list of nine attributes that are characteristic of a highly moral person caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind.
However, recent research in virtue ethics, character education, and political orientation across different cultures and religious traditions has suggested that these are Western moral values that need to be broadened Miller, The description of Western moral values may fail to adequately generalize the values of other non-Western cultures because Western moral values are limited to a Western understanding of morality. For example, face is an interesting value that is of considerable importance in many Eastern societies, although many Westerners do not have a great understanding of it Ting-Toomey, According to Confucian ethics, if any one member of the family does something immoral, all family members may suffer from loss of face Hwang, Thus, we suggest that culturally unique moral values need to be generated through a comprehensive study of the variance of cultural-specific moral identity in non-Western cultures.
One practical methodology of getting one-step closer to measure culturally non-biased moral identity is to create a list of culturally inclusive moral values from both Western and Eastern cultures.
Frist, participants from each culture at least two countries are asked to describe prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person. For example, Walker and Pitts asked Canadian adults to generate personality characteristics that were seen as descriptive of a highly moral person using a free-listing procedure. The total number of attributes provided by the participants was Several judgment rules were used to reduce the number of descriptors that participants had listed: any phrases and sentences were divided into single descriptors; adjectives were used instead of nouns; synonymous terms were combined; antonym pairs which were generated less frequently were deleted; idiosyncratic responses were eliminated Walker and Pitts, Finally, 92 attributes as descriptive of a highly moral person were included in the study.
However, prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person in Eastern cultures have been neglected. We suggest first replicating the previous procedure to ask participants from Eastern countries e. Third, researchers should compare the remaining Eastern moral values with the moral values generated in Western culture. Common descriptors between the two cultural lists should be identified as culturally shared moral values. Unique descriptors between the two cultural lists should be observed as culturally non-shared moral values in each culture.
Finally, a joint list of shared and non-shared descriptors exemplifies a culturally inclusive moral values that describes a highly moral person in both Western and Eastern societies.
We suggest that researchers should consider this culturally non-biased approach to investigate moral identities in different cultures, although the procedure makes it a time-consuming technique to use. Certainly this new study raises much to muse on.
While these anthropologists seem sure they are close to determining a universal set of moral rules that transcends specific cultures, this is not the end but inevitably just another chapter in an eternal debate. The new study was published in the journal Current Anthropology. Source: University of Oxford. LOG IN.
Menu HOME. Search Query Submit Search. By Rich Haridy. Facebook Twitter Flipboard LinkedIn. A study of 60 different cultures has confirmed seven universal moral rules based on social cooperation. View 1 Image. Rich Haridy. With interests in film, new media, and the new wave of psychedelic science, Rich has written for a number of online and print publications over the last decade and was Chair of the Australian Film Critics Association from Popular Stories.
Load More. Sign in to post a comment. Please keep comments to less than words. No abusive material or spam will be published. Mmmm, loving that sweet, delicious fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil Then why is his banal socialist commentary relevant? In turn, "Normality. In summary, Benedict says that what is habitual is synonyous with whatever is normal whatever is socially agreeable to the majority of people raised in that society.
But she also says that whatever is acceptable as normal due to social conditioning is moral. For example, if racism is moral in one's society, then it is moral to engage in the racist practices that are normal in the society.
This position is ethical relativism , the idea that moral goodness is to be equated with cultural norms. Melville Herskovits defends Benedict's position. Herskovits defends relativism on the grounds that it is an antidote to ethnocentrism , which has led Europeans and Americans to behave with intolerance toward cultures with different values.
Ironically, Benedict herself abandoned ethical relativism when she saw that it required her to endorse Nazi rule in Germany. It certainly sounds odd to say that a moral statement that once was false can be made true by the establishment of a new religious or political order and the consolidation of its ideas. Moral relativists are thus under some pressure to explain why they go beyond simple factual statements about what the majority in a society believes, insisting on advancing a philosophical claim about the truth of moral statements.
This is one reason some would give for viewing moral relativism as an instance of a more general relativism that sees the truth of any statement as a function of its coherence with a broader theoretical framework. Relativists who base their position on a sharp distinction between facts and values must work with two distinct notions of truth: factual claims are made true by correspondence to reality; moral claims are made true by cohering with or being entailed by the surrounding conceptual scheme.
Those who see truth of any kind as ultimately a matter of inter-subjective agreement may be better positioned to avoid this problem. A good deal of the debate surrounding moral relativism has focused on its claim to exemplify and foster tolerance. There are at least three lines of criticism against this claim. Showing genuine respect for a culture means taking its beliefs seriously, and that means viewing them as candidates for critical appraisal.
It suggests that the beliefs could not withstand critical scrutiny, or perhaps that they are just not worth appraising. Relativists say we should be tolerant of beliefs and practices found in other cultures. This is a normative claim. If it applies to everyone, then it is a trans-cultural moral principle, in which case relativism is false. If, on the other hand, relativism is true, then this principle of tolerance does not express a trans-cultural obligation binding on everyone; it merely expresses the values associated with a particular moral standpoint.
Tolerance is, of course, a central value espoused by modern liberal societies. So for other societies, the fact that relativism promotes tolerance is not a point in its favor, and relativists have no business preaching tolerance to them. It would not be self-contradictory for moral relativists to hold that all moral principles have only a relative validity except for the principle of tolerance, which enjoys a unique status. But the resulting position would be peculiar. The relativistic viewpoint would be significantly modified and some account would be owed of why the principle of tolerance alone has universal validity.
For this reason, a more common relativistic response to the criticism is along the lines suggested by David Wong. Relativists can simply accept that the obligation to be tolerant has only relative validity or scope. It applies to those whose general moral standpoint affirms or entails tolerance as a value; and only these people are likely to be swayed by the argument that relativism promotes tolerance.
It even requires us to be tolerant of intolerance, at least if it occurs in another culture. Clearly, this is a problem for anyone, relativist or not, who elevates the principle that we should be tolerant to an absolute, exceptionless rule. But for relativists who do not do this, the problem will seem less pressing. Tolerance, they will argue, is one of the values constitutive of their standpoint—a standpoint they share with most other people in modern liberal societies.
The relativistic stance is useful, however, in helping to make us less arrogant about the correctness of our own norms, more sensitive to cultural contexts when looking at how others live, and a little less eager in our willingness to criticize what goes on in other cultures.
The more difficult, practical question concerns not whether we should ever criticize the beliefs and practices found in other cultures, but whether we are ever justified in trying to impose our values on them through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, boycotts, or military force. This question has arisen in relation to such practices as satee in India, persecution of religious or ethnic minorities, female circumcision, and legalized violence against women.
But it is not a problem that only moral relativists have to confront. Over the years moral relativism has attracted a great deal of criticism, and not just from professional philosophers. One reason for this, of course, is that it is widely perceived to be a way of thinking that is on the rise. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century it had become a commonplace among teachers of moral philosophy in the US that the default view of morality held by the majority of college students was some form of moral relativism.
Another reason for so much trenchant criticism is that a relativistic view of morality is thought by many to have pernicious consequences. It typically amounts to little more than a skepticism about objective moral truth, often expressed as the idea that beliefs and actions are not right or wrong per se, only right or wrong for someone.
Philosophers like Gilbert Harman, David Wong, and Richard Rorty who defend forms of moral relativism seek to articulate and defend philosophically sophisticated alternatives to objectivism. As they see it, they are not countenancing immorality, injustice, or moral nihilism; rather, they are trying to say something about the nature of moral claims and the justifications given for them.
The main problem they face is to show how the denial of objective moral truth need not entail a subjectivism that drains the rationality out of moral discourse. Their critics, on the other hand, face the possibly even more challenging task of justifying the claim that there is such a thing as objective moral truth.
Emrys Westacott Email: Westacott alfred. Moral Relativism Moral relativism is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint for instance, that of a culture or a historical period and that no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others.
Historical Background a. Ancient Greece In the view of most people throughout history, moral questions have objectively correct answers. The statement declared that: Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole American Anthropologist , Vol.
Clarifying What Moral Relativism Is and Is Not Defining moral relativism is difficult because different writers use the term in slightly different ways; in particular, friends and foes of relativism often diverge considerably in their characterization of it. Descriptive Relativism Descriptive relativism is a thesis about cultural diversity.
Cultural Relativism Cultural relativism asserts that the beliefs and practices of human beings are best understood by grasping them in relation to the cultural context in which they occur. Ethical Non-Realism Ethical non-realism is the view that there is no objective moral order that makes our moral beliefs true or false and our actions right or wrong.
Meta-Ethical Relativism Meta-ethical relativism holds that moral judgments are not true or false in any absolute sense, but only relative to particular standpoints.
Moral Relativism Moral relativism has been identified with all the above positions; and no formula can capture all the ways the term is used by both its advocates and its critics. No standpoint can be proved objectively superior to any other. Arguments for Moral Relativism The main arguments for moral relativism are not necessarily all compatible. The Argument from Cultural Diversity Textbooks often suggest that relativists argue from the plain fact that different cultures have different moral belief systems to a relativistic view of morality; but this is an oversimplification.
The Untenability of Moral Objectivism The untenability of moral objectivism is probably the most popular and persuasive justification for moral relativism—that it follows from the collapse of moral objectivism, or is at least the best alternative to objectivism.
The Argument from Cognitive Relativism The majority of moral relativists do not embrace cognitive relativism, which offers a relativistic account of truth in general, not just the truth of moral judgments. However, some do, and this is another path to moral relativism One of the merits of this approach to moral relativism is that it can help to clarify fundamental questions about what is meant by talk about the relativity of moral claims.
Moral Relativism Promotes Tolerance The idea that moral relativism promotes tolerance is a normative argument. Objections to Moral Relativism a. Relativists Exaggerate Cultural Diversity The objection that relativists exaggerate cultural diversity is directed against descriptive relativism more than against moral relativism as defined above; but it has figured importantly in many debates about relativism.
Relativism Ignores Diversity Within a Culture When relativists say that the truth of moral claims and the rightness of actions is relative to the norms and values of the culture in which they occur, they seem to assume that members of that culture will generally agree about the moral framework which they supposedly share. Relativism Implies that Obvious Moral Wrongs are Acceptable The most serious objection to moral relativism is that relativism implies that obvious moral wrongs are acceptable.
Relativism Undermines the Possibility of a Society Being Self-Critical If the rightness or wrongness of actions, practices, or institutions can only be judged by reference to the norms of the culture in which they are found, then how can members of that society criticize those norms on moral grounds?
Relativism is Pragmatically Self-Refuting A standard objection to cognitive relativism, which is sometimes advanced against moral relativism, is that it is pragmatically self-refuting. Relativism Rests on an Incoherent Notion of Truth What does it mean for a moral belief to be true relative to a particular culture?
The Relativist Position on Tolerance is Problematic A good deal of the debate surrounding moral relativism has focused on its claim to exemplify and foster tolerance. Conclusion Over the years moral relativism has attracted a great deal of criticism, and not just from professional philosophers. References and Further Reading Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture. New York: Penguin, Studies three societies to show how beliefs and practices must be understood in the context of the culture in which they occur and its dominant values.
Carson, Thomas. The Status of Morality. Dordrecht: Reidel, A sophisticated defense of a version of moral relativism based on an analysis of how, and in what sense, moral judgments can be said to be true or false. Duncker, Karl. An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, Mass. Press, Argues that in every human society there are certain common norms and values presupposed by social interaction.
Harmen, Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press, Presents a version of moral relativism based on an analysis of what it means for someone to have a reason to do something.
Varieties of Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell, Catalogues the different types of relativism, including moral relativism, along with the main arguments for and against each type. Harrison, Geoffrey. Herskovits, Melville. Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism. New York: Random House, Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
Indianapolis: Hackett, First published in Krausz, Michael, and Meiland, Jack W. Relativism: Cognitive and Moral. Anthology of important articles on both kinds of relativism. Krausz, Michael ed. Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Extensive collection of articles; somewhat wider in scope than the Krausz-Meiland anthology. Ladd, John ed. Ethical Relativism. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Anthology that focuses on the contribution of anthropology to the moral relativism debate.
Levi, Neil. Moral Relativism: A Short Introduction. Oxford: Oneworld, A very clear study, fairly sympathetic to relativism, which analyzes and appraises many of the central arguments for and against.
Lukes, Steven. Moral Relativism. New York: Picador, A concise introduction that focuses on debates within the social sciences about culture and diversity. Mackie, J. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin, Montaigne, Michel de. Donald M. Stanford: Stanford University Press, Moody-Adams, Michele.
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